Limitation period for civil liability actions in traffic accidents
One of the most common questions that clients ask us when considering civil actions derived from a traffic accident refers to the starting date of the limitation period for such action, so we will try to shed light on this issue, in accordance with the provisions of our jurisprudence.
It should first be noted that the statute of limitations for claims for damages arising from a traffic accident (non-contractual civil actions) for accidents occurring in Catalonia is one (1) year, in accordance with the applicable sectoral law (Article 7.1 paragraph 2 of Royal Legislative Decree 8/2004 of 29 October, which approves the revised text of the Law on civil liability and insurance in the movement of motor vehicles “TRLRCSCVM”).
Despite the fact that the Civil Code of Catalonia, in its article 121. 21 D, establishes that the statute of limitations for claims arising from non-contractual fault is 3 years, exceptionally, the sectorial law mentioned above (TRLRCSCVM) is applicable, and this in accordance with the provisions, among others, of the Sentence of the Plenary of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court, of 6 September 2013, the STSJ of Catalonia, of 4 December 2017 (Roj: STSJ CAT 10699/2017), or the Ruling of the Provincial Court of Barcelona, of November 6, 2018 (ROJ: SAP B 10663/2018)).
In this sense, this sectorial law establishes, in its article 7.1. 2º TRLRCSCVM, that: “The injured party or his heirs will have direct action to demand from the insurer the satisfaction of the referred damages, which will prescribe for the course of one year“.
At this point, it is worth asking whether there are any differences in relation to the limitation period for initiating the action for damages when the action is directed against the insurance company and when it is directed against the driver of the vehicle.
Well, our Civil Code of Catalonia establishes that there is no difference if the action is directed against the insurance company or against the driver and/or owner of the vehicle (See the Sentence of the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, dated December 4, 2017), so, consequently, the period of one (1) year is the one that must be taken into consideration to initiate a legal procedure either against the causer of the accident or against the insurance company of the same.
Thus, the problem arises in relation to when the one-year limitation period for the exercise of the action should be considered to begin or also known legally as the “dies a quo“.
In accordance with article 121-23 of the CCCat, the calculation of the limitation period begins when, once the claim is born and can be exercised, the person who owns the claim knows or can reasonably know the circumstances that support it and the person against whom it can be exercised, which, according to our majority jurisprudence, is equivalent to the moment in which the injured party can know the scope and extent of the damages.
In this sense, the knowledge of the extent of the damage will depend on the moment in which the damage manifests itself (since it can be immediate damage, or supervened) and on the way in which it manifests itself, that is to say, the dies a quo varies depending on the type of personal injury.
As an example, if a pedestrian is run over, the beginning of the prescription period occurs when the damages are consolidated, which according to the Supreme Court occurs or, can be assimilated, to the date of the final medical discharge of the injured party.
It is worth mentioning the Sentence of the Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), of 20th September 2006 (EDJ 2006/265950), in which our highest Court reiterates the jurisprudential doctrine regarding the establishment of the “dies a quo” in matters of personal injury, establishing that the prescription period cannot be counted from the date of production of the injury, but from the date in which the injured party had a certain, safe and exact knowledge of the entity of the injury.
But, when does the injured party have a certain, safe and exact knowledge of the damages suffered?
The Supreme Court Decision of July 22, 2008 (EDJ 2008/128008) even transfers the referred dies a quo to a later moment than the medical discharge, that is, not from the date when the injured party has evidence of the definitive medical discharge, but from the moment when the permanent disability or defects originating and irreversible from the injury are determined when after the medical discharge residual sequelae requiring further treatment are maintained. In the same sense, the STS (Civil) of October 15, 2009 (EDJ 2009/239966), the Provincial Court of Barcelona itself, with a direct reference to the aforementioned STS of 2006, through its Ruling of June 11, 2008 (EDJ 2008/134884) and STS (Civil) of July 22, 2008 (EDJ 2008/128008) have also pronounced.
Regarding the dies a quo for the beginning of the calculation of the prescription period when what is claimed is the material damages suffered (clothes, vehicles, pharmacy bills, etc.), the jurisprudence has been considering that it does begin from the moment of the accident or, depending on the case and type of damages (as for example in cases of damage to the vehicle), when an expert assessment has been carried out to determine the extent of the damages.
Finally, we must briefly refer to the possibility of interrupting the limitation period, and is that we must take into account that the judicial or extrajudicial claim (burofax) of the injured will interrupt the computation of the limitation period of one year, extending it one more year.
In this sense, although the Catalan regulations do not establish the form in which the claim should be carried out, our jurisprudence has pointed out, based on art. 1973 CC, the form in which the interruption should be materialized through a skillful means and in an adequate manner, identifying the right that is intended to be preserved and transferring it to the appropriate person. Likewise, it has been established on numerous occasions that it is absolutely necessary, in order to determine whether there is any doubt about the right that is to be preserved and the person against whom it is to be preserved, without there being any doubt about whether an action has been brought or another one that is similar.
In short, the statute of limitations in the civil liability action derived from traffic accidents is one (1) year, and the “dies a quo” from which this period begins to run, in the case of injuries, is the one in which the injuries are stabilized and the sequels materialize (in the worst case, the date of medical discharge can be considered), because it is at that moment when the extent of the sequels and their quantification for the purposes of compensation for the injured party can be determined with precision.
Therefore, it is essential not to lose sight of this period of one (1) year in order to avoid possible unpleasant surprises at the time of initiating a judicial procedure of this type. It is advisable to insist, through written communications addressed to the tortfeasor and, especially, to the insurance company of the same (as direct civil responsible) in order to interrupt the mentioned period of prescription of the action.
